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THE "COMPULSORY SCHOOL
ATTENDANCE" CASE
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 92 S. Ct. 1526 (1972)
0 PETITION from the State of Wisconsin, the Supreme Court granted
certiorari to review the decision of the Wisconsin Supreme Court,
which held the respondents' convictions for violating the state's com-
pulsory school attendance law were invalid under the Free Exercise
Clause of the First Amendment and the Fourteenth Amendment.'
The respondents, Jonas Yoder, Oden Yutzky, members of the Old
Order of Amish religion and Wallace Miller, a member of the Conserva-
tive Amish Mennonite Church, had children, Frieda Yoder, aged 15;
Barbara Miller, also 15, and Vernon Yutzky, 14, who had completed the
8th grade but who were not enrolled in any private school or within any
recognized exception to the compulsory attendance law.
2 They are
conceded to be subject to the Wisconsin statute. The respondents refused
to enroll their children in public high school as required by the
compulsory law3 and were fined five ($5.00) dollars each. The conviction
was reversed by the Wisconsin Supreme Court and their holding affirmed
by the United States Supreme Court.
HISTORY OF THE OLD ORDER AMISH:
To understand the Amish attitude and comprehend why Amishmen,
like Yoder, are so recalcitrant in their opposition to laws compelling such
attendance, it is necessary to know something of their religious beliefs
and the value system that underlies their separated society.
4
The Amish trace their existence as an independent sect to the late
17th Century.
5
1 Yoder v. State, 49 Wis.2d 430, 182 N.W.2d 539, afl'd 92 S. Ct. 1526 (1972).
2 WIsc. STAT. ANN. § 118.15. Pertinent provisions of which statute are: "Unless the
child has a legal excuse, any person having under his control a child between the ages
of 7 and 16 shall cause such child to attend school regularly ... to the end of the
school term in which child becomes 16."
3d.
4 See generally J. HOSTETLER, AMIsH SOCIETY (1968) [hereinafter cited as HOSTETLER];
J. HOSTETLER and G. HUNTINGTON, CHILDREN IN AMISH SOCIETY (1971); Littell,
Sectarian Protestantism and the Pursuit of Wisdom: Must Technological Objectives
Prevail? in PUBLIC CONTROLS FOR NON-PUBLIC SCHOOLS (Erickson ed., 1969).
5 HosTETLER at 40. Under Jacob Ammon, the Amish broke with Mennonites in 1693.
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The principal concern of the present-day followers of Ammon is the
belief that separation from the world is the sine qua non of spiritual
salvation.6 The Amish have derived a dualistic conception of reality:
"[t]o the Amish, there is a divine spiritual reality, the Kingdom of God,
and a Satanic Kingdom that dominates the present world.., therefore, the
Amishmen must not behave like the world." 7 Given this basic belief, it is
not difficult to understand the plight of the Amishmen. At stake is not
only their survival as a separate subculture but also their individual
salvation. The Amish avoid contact with the outside world to the extent
that it is possible. For example, almost all Amishmen abstain from
military service, payment or collection of Social Security benefits,
insurance coverage, and litigation.8 They do not actively oppose the larger
society except when its requirements would force them to violate deeply
held religious convictions. They abide by tax laws, are productive farmers;
they are not on welfare or unemployed, and they are not proselytes
of their creed.9
In many ways they are "model" citizens. However, the main conflict
between Amish and the rest of society is their objection to compulsory
education in public schools. Until recently Amish educational beliefs
aroused little interest. At one time, compulsory public education consisted
of limited instruction, one-room local school houses and minimal
certification standards for teachers; 10 the Amish educational experience
differed little from that of any rural child. Recent developments in
public education have changed this situation drastically. Stringent state
laws concerning compulsory school attendance," minimum certification
standards for teachers, 12 and uniform curricular requirements have put an
end to one-room school houses.' 3 The Amish do not want to be subjected
to the influence of the public schools or learn the values of a world they
consider to be part of the "Satanic Kingdom." To avoid "eternal
damnation," they want their children to be educated in Amish schools,
taught by Amishmen, in accordance with the Amish value system, to
prepare them for a life in the separated Amish society.
6 
HosTETLER at 48.
1 Id. at 56.
8 The Amish are so opposed to litigation that their cause is taken to court by the
National Committee for Amish Religious Freedom and the American Civil Liberties
Union. Casad, Compulsory High School Attendance and the Old Order Amish: A
Commentary on State v. Garber, 16 U. KAN. L. REy. 423 (1968) [hereinafter cited
as Casad].
9 Casad at 425.
10Prior to enactment of Wisc. STAT. ANN. H 118.15, 118.19, 118.01 (1969) discussed
on page 4 of text, educational standards were minimal in Wisconsin.
"See e.g., Wisc. STAT. ANN. 1118.15 (1969).
12 See e.g., Wisc. STAT. ANN. § 118.19 (1969).
'3 See e.g., Wisc. STAT. ANN. § 118.01 (1969).
[Vol. 6:1
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Prior to Yoder, the Amish had been unsuccessful in raising the First
Amendment as a bar to state compulsory education laws in state courts.
1 4
The Amish legal argument is not easily analyzed and is not a simple free
exercise dispute. It not only involves the state and parent but the child as
well. 15 The Supreme Court has ruled that the state is allowed to infringe
on the free exercise of the parent and the child for permissable reasons.'
6
Generally speaking, the state may provide for the child's welfare in its
capacity as parens patriae.'7 However, this doctrine, once giving the state
substantial control over the child, is gradually being redefined.' 8 The
parent's control, within reasonable limits of rearing the child, has been
judicially recognized.' 9 The child also has his own free exercise claim
as well as some ill-defined right to be free of parental control if that
control is clearly inimical to his welfare.
20
This tangled web of conflicting interests is further complicated by the
absence of judicial decisions defining the child's position in relation to his
parent and the state. 21 Prior to Yoder, Amish litigation turned exclusively
on resolution of the parent's free exercise claim. Therefore, to evaluate the
Amish position one must have a basic understanding of free exercise pro-
tection and the history of its judicial interpretation by the Supreme Court.
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees,
in relevant part, that "Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.. .."
Until recently, free exercise protection was no defense to state
regulations which, although indirectly or directly infringing on religious
practices, were enacted in pursuit of a permissible secular objective.2 2
In Reynolds v. United States,23 the Supreme Court upheld the federal
bigamy conviction of a Mormon who took a second wife in accordance
with accepted doctrine of his church. The Court found that the First
Amendment deprived Congress "of all legislative power over mere
opinion, but left it free to reach actions which were in violation of social
14 State v. Garber, 197 Kan. 567, 419 P.2d 896, cert. denied 389 U.S. 51 (1967); State
v. Hershberger, 103 Ohio App. 188, 144 N.E.2d 693 (1955); Commonwealth v. Beiler,
168 Pa. Super. 462, 79 A.2d 134 (1951).
15 See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 92 S. Ct. 1526 (1972) (Douglas, J. dissenting at 1547-48).
16 Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944) (child-labor).
17 Id. at 163.
18 See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967); Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
19 Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
20 The Supreme Court has recognized that the Bill of Rights protection extends to
children. See In re Gault, 387, U.S. 1, 13 (1967); Also, Justice Douglas' dissenting
opinion in principal case Wisconsin v. Yoder, 92 S. Ct. 1526, 1547-48 (1972).
21 Forer, Rights of Children: A Legal Vacuum, 55 A.B.A.J. 1151 (1969).
22 Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
2398 U.S. 145 (1878).
Winter, 19731 RECENT CASES
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duties or subversive of good order. ' 24 This belief-action dichotomy was
not explained by the Court, but simply stated that while laws "cannot inter-
fere with mere religious beliefs and opinions, they may with practices."2 5
For many years, the so-called "secular-regulation" rule prevailed.
In Cantwell v. Connecticut,26 the Court seemingly abandoned the
belief-action distinction. Cantwell, a Jehovah's Witness was arrested for
distributing anti-Catholic literature in an area of New Haven which was
90% Catholic. The Court reversed his conviction for violation of an
antisolicitation statute when it found that the First Amendment guarantee
of free exercise "embraces two concepts-freedom to believe and freedom
to act. The first is absolute but, in the nature of things, the second cannot
be. Conduct remains subject to regulation for the protection of society."' 27
At this time, the Court embarked upon a search for some principle
for saying just how far action was protected. "In every case, the power
to regulate must be so exercised as to not, in attaining a permissible
end, unduly infringe upon the protected freedom." 28 "No clear test
emerged out of this case but having given up the belief-action distinction
and with it the secular regulation rule, the Court had to find some means
to weigh the interests involved." 29
In Prince v. Massachusetts,30 the defendant was convicted of violating
a Massachusetts child labor law by permitting her nine-year-old niece to
sell religious magazines on a street corner in the evening. The girl and
her aunt were both, according to Jehovah's Witness' doctrine, ordained
ministers; the girl "believed it was her religious duty."131 The Court found
it must balance "the rights of children to exercise their religion, and
of parents to give them religious training". . . against. . ."the interest of
society to protect the welfare of children. 32
While the state cannot wholly prohibit the form of adult activity, this
does not mean it cannot do so for children." The Court posited
a higher interest, "Acting to guard the general interest in youths' well
being, the state as parens patriae may restrict the parent's control....
24 Id. at 164.
25 Id. at 166.
26 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
27 Id. at 303-04.
28 Id. at 304.
29 Galenter, Religious Freedom in the U.S.: A Turning Point, 1966, Wisc. L. REv. 217
at pg. 237 [hereinafter cited as Galenter.
30 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
31 Id. at 163.
32 Id. at 165.
[Vol. 6:1
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The right to practice religion freely does not include liberty to expose
•.. the child... to ill health." 33
Prince was the last important free exercise case decided by the
Supreme Court until 1961. In the Sunday closing law cases,
34 the secularly
oriented state laws had only an "indirect" effect on the defendants'
religious freedom and did not violate the First Amendment. But the
Court adhered to the theme of Cantwell by noting, for example, that:
[i]f the State regulates conduct by enacting a general law within its
power, the purpose and effect of which is to advance the State's
secular goal, the statute is valid despite its indirect burden on
religious observances unless the State may accomplish its purpose
by means which do not impose such a burden.
35
In 1963, the Court expanded free exercise in Sherbert v. Verner,
3 6
which one writer states as the dawn of a new day for religious freedom
claims. 37 In Sherbert, a Seventh-Day Adventist textile worker was
discharged by her employer for unwillingness to work on Saturday (her
Sabbath). Her claim for unemployment compensation was denied on
the ground that she was not "available for work according to state
law." Mr. Justice Brennan, writing for the Court, found that "if the
purpose or effect of a law is to discriminate invidiously between
religions, that law is constitutionally invalid even though the burden
may be characterized as being only indirect.
38
The Court also stated: "[t]he state cannot condition public benefits
whatever their purpose, so that they operate to inhibit or deter the
exercise of first amendment freedoms."3 9 A burden on free exercise may
be "justified by a 'compelling state interest in the regulation of a subject
within the state's constitutional power to regulate.'. ..,40 But such
justification must be more than a "showing merely of a rational
relationship to some colorable state interest .... -41 "'Only the gravest
abuses, endangering paramount interests gives occasion for permissible
interest.' "42 The state must also show there are no "alternative forms
33 Id. at 168.
34 Braunfield v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961); Gallagher v. Croon Kosher Super
Market, 366 U.S. 582 (1961); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961); Two
Guys from Harrison-Allentown v. McGinley, 366 U.S. 585 (1961).
35 Braunfield v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 at 605 (1961).
36 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
37 Galenter, at 220.
38 374 U.S. at 404.
39 Id. at 405.
40 Id. at 403, quoting from NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963).
41 374 U.S. at 406.
42 Id., quoting from Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945).
Winter, 19731 RECENT CASES
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of regulation. ' 43 In the present case no such justifications underlie
the determination of the state court that appellant's religion makes her
ineligible to receive benefits. 44
In Sherbert, there is presumably no such justification for not having
an exemption. Sherbert departed most markedly from prior cases by
expanding the definition of protected activity and by increasing the burden
on the state in justifying infringements on religious activity. Prior to
the new approach to religious freedom, taken by the Supreme Court in
Sherbert, state courts45 had denied the constitutional claim.
Justice Burger, in Wisconsin v. Yoder,46  readily admits the
importance of a state to educate its citizens and "to impose reasonable
regulations for the control and duration of basic education. ' 47 But, using
Pierce v. Society of Sisters,4a the Chief Justice notes that "however highly
we rank it [education], it is not totally free from a balancing process when
it impinges on other fundamental rights and interests such as those spe-
cifically protected by the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment." 49
The opinion then applies the Sherbert test consisting of a two-step
procedure: first, inquiry whether the challenged statute interferes with the
constitutional freedom to act in accordance with one's sincere religious
beliefs and second, if there is evidence of such interference, whether there
is a "compelling" state interest which would warrant such infringement.
In weighing the quality of the claims of the individual interest, the
opinion touched upon all the factors considered in Sherbert.50 The factors
involved are the sincerity of the individual's belief51 which the opinion
notes is obvious from the record, and the "centrality or importance of
the activity for which the exemption is claimed to the beliefs and practices
of the religion espoused by the claimant. '5 2 Here Justice Burger states
43 Braunfield v. Brown, 321 U.S. at 165.
44 374 U.S. at 409.
45 These state court decisions recognized the Amish life style as a belief but found the
state's interest in educating children paramount to parental claims based on religion or
conscience. Accord, Commonwealth v. Beiler 168 Pa. Super. 462, 79 A.2d 134 (1951);
State v. Hershberger 103 Ohio App. 188, 144 N.E.2d 693 (1955); State v. Garber 197
Kan. 567, 419 P.2d 896 (1966), cert. denied 389 U.S. 51 (1969).
46 92 S. Ct. 1526 (1972).
47 Id. at 1532.
48268 U.S. 510 at 534 (1925). This case suggests "that values of parental direction of
the religious upbringing and education of their children in their early and formative
years have a high place in our society."
49 92 S. Ct. at 1532.5 OSee Gianella, Religious Liberty, Non-Establishment, and Doctrinal Development,
Part I: The Religious Liberties Guarantee, 80 HARv. L. REV. 1381 (1967) [hereinafter
cited as Gianella].
51 Id. at 1417.
52 Id. at 1419.
[Vol. 6:1
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that the Amish faith and their mode of life must be "inseparable and
interdependent," not just a "subjective evaluation or rejection of the
contemporary values accepted by the majority." However, he notes "giving
no weight to such secular considerations, we see that the record in the
case abundantly supports the claim that the traditional way of life of
the Amish is not merely a matter of personal preference but one of deep
religious conviction."
'5 3
The Chief Justice drew some rather strict religious lines around this
newly defined area of liberty when he stated "the very concept of ordered
liberty precludes allowing every person to make his own standards on mat-
ters of conduct in which society as a whole has important interests."
'5 4 The
final factor to be weighed is "the extent to which the application of the
regulation would burden the individual's ability to exercise his religion.1
55
The Chief Justice balances again in favor of the Amish when he
states:
[T]he impact of the compulsory attendance law on respondents'
practice of the Amish religion is not only severe but inescapable...
[and this regulation].. . carries with it precisely the kind of objecting
danger to the free exercise of religion which the First Amendment
was designed to prevent.
5 6
Having found that this regulation interfered with the Amish religious
freedom guaranteed by the First Amendment, the state must show a
"compelling interest." The majority held that this more demanding test
had not been met. In reaching this conclusion, the Court rejected the
State's broad contention that its interest in its system of compulsory
education is so compelling that even the established religious practices
of the Amish must give way. "The court must examine the interests
which the state seeks to promote by its requirement for compulsory
education to age sixteen and the impediment to those objectives that
would flow from recognizing the claimed Amish exemption."
57
It is an important constitutional doctrine that a law generally
constitutional "on its face," may be unconstitutional "as applied" in
specific instances. The Amish case marks the first occasion that the Court
has clearly articulated that exception in favor of a minority religious
group. It would appear that compulsory education laws are-"on their
face"--within a state's constitutional powers, but under the facts of this
case, the First Amendment requires that the Amish be exempt. The
opinion stated:
53 92 S. CL at 1533.
54 Id. at 1533.
5 Gianella at 1421.
5692 S. Ct. at 1534.
57 Id. at 1536.
RECENT CASESWinter, 19731
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It is one thing to say that compulsory education for a year or two
beyond the eighth grade may be necessary when its goal is the
preparation of the child for life in modern society as the majority
live, but it is quite another if the goal of education be viewed as
the preparation of the child for life in the separated agrarian
community that is the keystone of the Amish faith.58
The Court admitted the existence of a valid state interest yet
recognized this exception for the Amish. The Court felt that education
beyond the eighth grade would work involuntary assimilation of Amish
children into the mainstream of American life at the expense of the
continued existence of the Old Order Amish.
Perhaps most significant is that the entire controversy boiled down
to one or two years of additional schooling since the Wisconsin statute
does not require schooling past age sixteen-Justices White, Brennan and
Stewart based their concurring votes on this factor. The Court realized
that the interest of the State in securing one or two more years of
education for a small minority of its youth was not of such importance
as to justify the possible disestablishment of a unique American
subculture. The opinion states:
... [T]here is strong evidence that Amish are capable of fulfilling
the social and political responsibilities of citizenship without com-
pelled attendance beyond the eighth grade at the price of jeopardizing
their free exercise of religious belief .... 59
The Court also rejected the State's argument from Prince v.
Massachusetts,6" indicating that due regard should be given to the power
of the State in its capacity as parens patriae to extend the benefit of
secondary education to children regardless of the wishes of the parents.
This case, as noted by the Court, is not one in which any harm to the
physical or mental health of the child or to the public safety, peace, order
or welfare has been demonstrated or may be properly inferred. 61 The
Court felt that:
... the state's argument appears to rest on the potential that
exemption of Amish parents from the requirements of the compulsory
education law might allow some parents to act contrary to the best
interest of their children by foreclosing their opportunity to make
intelligent choices between the Amish way of life and that of the
outside world. 62
58Id. at 1536-37.
59 Id. at 1537-38.
60 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
61 Compare Jacobsen v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905); Wright v. DeWitt School
District, 238 Ark. 906, 385 S.W.2d 644 (1965).
62 92 S. Ct. at 1540-41.
(Vol. 6:1
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The Court rejected this notion when it stated:
Indeed, it seems clear that if the State is empowered as parens patriae
to "save" a child from himself or his Amish parents by requiring an
additional two years of formal high school education, the State will in
large measure influence the religious future of the child .... We cannot
accept a parens patriae claim of such all-encompassing scope .... 61
Finally, the Amish opinion has some phrases that cannot help but
benefit the whole spectrum of religious minorities. The Chief Justice
admonished, "A way of life that is odd or even erratic but interferes
with no rights or interests of others is not to be condemned because
it is different."
64
And yet the opinion warns eccentrics, radicals or even individualists
who have rejected social values:
... it cannot be overemphasized that we are not dealing with a way
of life and mode of education by a group claiming to have recently
discovered some "progressive" or more enlightened process.... In
light of this convincing showing, one which "probably few other
religious groups or sects could make"... it was incumbent on the
State to show with more particularity how its admittedly strong
interest in compulsory education would be adversely affected by
granting an exemption to the Amish.
65
Douglas' dissent found criticism mainly in the area of the rights of
children. The majority essentially balanced the interests of the State against
the defendant's right to raise his child in a manner consistent with his
religious beliefs. Justice Douglas criticized the majority for failing to take
account of the Amish child's right to a formal state-approved education
and to a meaningful choice whether or not to remain in the Amish faith
after adolescence. He believed the child's continuing formal education
was clearly denied as a result of the decision:
If the parents in this case are allowed a religious exemption, the
inevitable effect is to impose the parents' notion of religious duty
upon their children. Where the child is mature enough to express
potentially conflicting desires, it would be an invasion of the child's
rights to permit such an imposition without canvassing his view...
if the child is mature enough to have that desire, the State may
well be able to override the parents' religiously motivated objections.
Religion is an individual experience.
66
Justice Douglas noted that recent cases have clearly held that children
themselves have constitutionally protectible interests.6 7
63 Id. at 1541-42.
64 Id. at 1528.
65 id. at 1543.
66 Id. at 1546.
67See Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596 (1948); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967); In re
Winship 397 U.S. 350 (1970).
RECENT CASESWinter, 19731
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While the judicial recognition of children's rights is in an embryonic
stage, the cases cited above provide some standard by which those rights
can begin to be measured and refined. Justice Douglas was keenly aware
that the standard in the Yoder decision raised questions concerning the
extent to which it may deprive the Amish child of free exercise of
religion, due process or equal protection of the law. He stated that "On
this important and vital matter of education, I think the children should
be entitled to be heard . . . before the State gives the exemption which
we honor today."' 68
Though the majority opinion ignored the rights of Amish children,
undoubtedly the Chief Justice's opinion will be regarded as a milestone
in the development of the exercise of religion clause.
The Court rejected the antiquated notions that actions, even though
religiously grounded, are outside the protection of the Free Exercise
Clause of the First Amendment. In so ruling, the Supreme Court departed
from the teaching of Reynolds.6 9 As Justice Douglas stated:
Action which the Court deemed to be antisocial, could be punished
even though it was grounded on deeply held and sincere religious
convictions. What we do today, at least in this respect, opens the way
to give organized religion a broader base than it has ever enjoyed .... 70
The decision goes to a greater length than ever before in extending
the constitutional exemption to factions of American religious impulses.
Prior decisions of lower state courts 71 had held contrary to Amish beliefs
in school cases on the basis of the now-questionable distinction between
"belief" and "actions." Now that the "belief-action" dichotomy has been
swept away, many other religious practices may receive constitutional
protection. Do Black Muslim prisoners have the right to pork-free diets?
Do Seventh-Day Adventists have to suffer loss of employment under
union-shop contracts when, in accordance with their church's teachings,
they refuse to pay union dues? Is it permissible for members of the Native
American Church (Indians) or members of the Neo-American Church
(non-Indians) to use drugs as a part of a religious ceremony? 72
Before the Amish decision, constitutional lawyers would have been
hesitant to predict how the Supreme Court might act but this decision
seems to have opened the doors to "sincere" religious sects.
MICHAEL BUCHICCH1O
68 92 S. Ct. at 1548.
69 Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
70 92 S. Ct. at 1549.
71Supra note 41, 42-44. Commonwealth v. Beiler, 168 Pa. Super. 462, 79 A.2d 134
(1951).
72 See N.Y. Times, May 22, 1972 at 2, Col. 1.
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